Remarks by Ambassador Charles B. Salmon, Jr.
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Commander in Chief
U.S. Pacific Command

Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great privilege to address such a distinguished group. I served in Asia or worked on Asian issues for most of my 32 years in the Foreign Service. Consequently, I have long been aware of the constructive role PBEC has played in the Pacific over the last three decades.

From 1993 to 1996, I served as the Foreign Policy Advisor to three Commanders in Chief of the Pacific Command. This summer Admiral Prueher brought me out of retirement for three months to serve in my old job. Since late 1996, I have worked as Foreign Policy Advisor and Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, a Department of Defense funded regional studies center, which owes its existence to the vision of former Secretaries of Defense Chaney and Perry. Consequently, I bring to today's topic the vision or at least the viewpoint of both the practitioner and the academic.

In preparing for this address I reviewed speeches I have made to similar groups over the last few years. I found them a paean to the inevitable progress everyone was predicting for the region. I found only one phrase that might demonstrate I had not been as short sighted and unimaginative as I had been. In 1995 addressing Asian triumphalism and the inevitability of the 21st Century being the Asian century, I cautioned the symposium on East Asian Security, a collaborative program between CINCPAC and the U.S. Information Agency that the only certainty in life was the biblical maxim that "pride goeth before a fall."

Certainly this maxim is also apposite to the United States. I have been moderately encouraged that as post-cold war and post-Gulf War euphoria has dissipated and the intractability of problems we are encountering in Europe, Africa, and South Asia comes home to us, we hear less chest thumping rhetoric about "America the Indispensable" and more realistic albeit grudging admission of the necessity for genuine mutual cooperation and true interdependence.

As World Bank President Wolfensohn reminded us in Washington less than two weeks ago, a silent crisis is looming on the horizon. It lies in the area of what my Center calls comprehensive security. Three billion more people on the planet within a quarter century. Two billion people suffering from chronic water shortages in the same time frame. The trebling of urban populations over the next three decades, a food security problem which will require food production to double within the next 30 years. I am no neo-Malthusian, but find such statistics compelling. Unless we address the fundamental issue of the essential interdependence of the developed and the developing world, we will have no durable peace or security.

But let me move from this somewhat cosmic plane and focus on the more traditional security situation in the Asia-Pacific. I hope our Latin American friends will not be discomfited by their omission from my upcoming catalogue. I would only note that with the exception of the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru their security challenges would seem to be in the non-traditional or transnational areas.

Let me begin with the Asia Pacific country I know best, the United States. We are going through a rough political patch. Our current domestic difficulties, while profoundly unedifying, will in my judgment have no significant impact on American's ability to play a leadership role in the world and in the Asia-Pacific in particular. Our particular challenge is a familiar one, which has been with us from our independence. It is for our leadership to persuade the American citizenry that now that the bipolar world is no more, it remains in American interest to remain engaged abroad and not to retreat to within our national border. This might seem an unlikely development to this sophisticated audience. But, as National Security Advisor Berger recently reminded us there are Americans who honestly believe that our wealth and security are exclusively home grown and that there is little to gain from foreign engagement and indeed much to surrender in resources expended, sovereignty diluted, jobs and even lives lost. Consequently, it is fully understandable that our friends in the region question us constantly on our commitment to maintain approximately 100 thousand defense forces forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific region.

Will the current financial crisis, which is now affecting the United States economy lead to any alteration in that commitment? I think not. There is still overwhelming bipartisan support for this deployment. We have been mercifully free from Asian reruns of the Mansfield amendment. Assuming no decline in the generous host nation support provided by our Japanese allies and no fundamental alteration of the situation on the Korean peninsula. I see no indication that we will be faced with congressional or popular pressure to decrease this commitment. Having said that, everyone is agreed that combat capability is a more meaningful measure of commitment than mere numbers. Thus over time, as a result of improvements in logistics, training and weaponry, it may be possible to make adjustments to this so far sacrosanct number. But, it goes without saying that any changes would have to be the subject of intense consultations with our allies and friends in the region.

Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of our security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. President Clinton's September meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi in New York, his upcoming visit to Japan, as well as the recent 2 plus 2 meetings between Secretaries Albright and Cohen and their Japanese counterparts have -- to use Secretary Albright's words -- "reaffirmed the firm friendship and unshakable alliance between the United States and Japan." Still differences over Japan's response to the financial crisis and a tendency on the part of some American officials to hector and lecture the Japanese about stepping up to their responsibilities have not gone down well. Also the United States' perceived insensitivity to Japanese concerns about the North Korean launching of the Taepodong missile was a cause of friction between the allies including temporary suspension of Japanese commitments under the Agreed Framework. But, the Japanese government continues to work on legislation to implement revised Defense Guidelines and both countries labor to resolve problems associated with United States military presence in Okinawa.

Japan faces major political problems. Distressed by the persisting economic recession, the Japanese voters have indicated a desire for change and political realignment. A formidable challenge for whatever leadership emerges from this realignment will be to persuade the Japanese citizenry that the requirement for the basing of American service personnel in their country remains essential to Japan's own security and the region's as well. Former Prime Minister Hoskawa's recent article in Foreign Affairs questioning the need for a continued United States presence suggests that there may be a growing doubt about the necessity of a United States presence even among the previously well disposed political elite. The Taepodong launching and the announcement of increased United States-Japanese cooperation on ballistic missile defense, however, may have attenuated this tendency.

Growth of anti-alliance or disengagement sentiment in Japan would be a cause of concern throughout the region, but above all, in Korea and China. Korea's overwhelming political challenge is to maintain support for President Kim Dae Jong's sunshine policy, which looks to reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. How soon such reconciliation may take place is anyone's guess. Almost as challenging is improving relations with Japan. This requires coming to terms with the past. Korea needs to think less about it and Japan more.

Hopefully, the Japanese decision to apologize in writing for their colonial activities in Korea will make possible the "future oriented relations" President Kim spoke about in his recent speech to the Japanese Diet. President Kim's visit to Japan is a major step forward in the relationship and is indicative of his capacity for true statesmanship. Of particular importance to the security of the region was the commitment in the joint Japan-Korea declaration to promoting the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea under the auspices of the Korean Peninsula Development Organization.

The Republic of Korea recently announced a cut in the 1999 Defense Budget, the first such cut in 50 years of the Republic of Korea's existence. Seoul attributed this cut to the economic turndown. While it should have no adverse effect on the balance of forces on the peninsula it does suggest the enormity of the problems Seoul is facing. As our Special Envoy for Korea told our Congress on September 24, despite our frustration and alarm over North Korean actions, the United States and the Republic of Korea will always be dealing with the North from a position of political, economic and military superiority.

The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most dangerous places in the world. The recent missile launching and reports of suspicious underground facilities and continued missile sales all highlight the threat North Korea poses with or without a financial crisis. I made my fifth visit to the DMZ this summer with Admiral Prueher. I was reminded again that this is the last unfinished chapter of the cold war. Four party talks including the two Koreas, China and the United States resume in Geneva tomorrow. North Korea demands that the agenda be the withdrawal of United States troops from the peninsula and the signing of a peace treaty with the United States, are hardly promising since these were the same issues on which two previous iterations of the talks foundered.

China has played a constructive role in seeking to resolve tensions on the peninsula. The United States has recognized this, just as we have recognized China's responsible approach to the current financial crisis. This is shorthand for the policy of maintaining the current value of the renminbi. How long China can sustain such a policy I leave to you experts. If China devalues, and thereby exacerbates the current financial crisis, this would be unfortunate. But, I would not see this as having any long lasting security implications. China's action would, however, simply reinforce strongly held reservations about China and its future role among its neighbors particularly in Southeast Asia. I would note, however, that China's position vis-à-vis the Spratlys and other Islands in the South China Sea appears to have moderated.

Even after the Indian nuclear explosion, I view China's security problems as primarily internal. It must maintain national unity; ensure more equitable development throughout the countryside, resolve or at least ameliorate a vast unemployment problem; downsize and professionalize the Armed forces; rationalize state owned enterprises and cope with staggering environmental and resources problems. It must reach an accommodation with Taiwan and the current talks between Wang Daohan and his Taiwan counterpart, Koo Chen-fu are moderately encouraging, although my own guess would be that we shall not see major progress until after the Taiwan elections in 2000.

One of my old bosses Admiral Macke was asked regularly whether he thought China was a threat. Not in my lifetime was his stock and sensible reply. The visits of President Jiang Zemin to the United States last year and President Clinton to China earlier this year and their mutual embrace of the concept of strategic partnership indicates that the trend in United States-China relations is positive. This in turn contributes to regional security. It is unfortunate that zealots on the left and right of the American political spectrum, some well meaning and some quite malign, continue to do all they can to torpedo United States-China relations, thereby undermining not only our long-term security interests, but those of the States of the region.

To conclude this brief survey of Northeast Asia, some words about Russia. It has fallen off the Asia-Pacific radar screen. Or at least the Russian Far East has where military readiness levels have declined considerably. The contest of wills between the Russian Duma and the Presidency must be resolved before progress can be made. Russia must resuscitate its economy and root out Mafia style corruption of colossal magnitude. Prescribing medication is easy. How Russia obtains it and whether it will be willing to take it if it can is still unclear. What remains certain is that Russia is enormously important for Asia-Pacific development and security. The region must take its interests into account. Simply dismissing these interests because Russia seems down and out is the antithesis of preventive defense and a sure guarantee of serious security problems somewhere down the road.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was long the poster boy for successful regional organization. Comprised originally of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines it later expanded to include Brunei and later still Vietnam, Laos, Burma and the pending member Cambodia. I first visited the original ASEAN five 32 years ago as a young Foreign Service Officer. No one can overestimate the tremendous transformation which has taken place over the last three decades or the signal contributions of now discredited or embattled leaders like Suharto and Prime Minister Mahatir. But of course ASEAN was also the epicenter of the financial melt down which eventually morphed into today's world financial crisis.

ASEAN's greatest political and security challenge is restoring the level of mutual trust, confidence and cohesion which obtained prior to the current crisis. Recent developments have undeniably attenuated ASEAN unity and solidarity. Relations between Singapore and Malaysia are probably the worst they have been since the two countries elected to go their separate ways. Malaysia and Indonesia have had their problems as have Thailand and Malaysia. ASEAN is facing the problems attendant on its becoming a two tier organization with the admission of the economically less developed states of the former Indochina and Burma. ASEAN must also accept the reality that the ASEAN Regional Forum may be losing its relevance due to ASEAN's disinclination to let others share the driver's seat. The ARF has long been viewed as a promising vehicle for promoting regional security but its utility seems increasingly under question.

During the World Economic Forum in Singapore last week, Assistant Secretary of State Stan Roth was asked whether the current economic crisis would lead to a security conflict. He replied that "I don't see the unity wiped away even under the strains of the present situation." The Thai Deputy Foreign Minister, Sukhumbhand Paribrata expressed a similar view stating that "War has become almost inconceivable." I don't differ with these views. On the internal front, however, I need not delineate the political woes besetting Indonesia in particular and also Malaysia. Indonesia is critically important to the health of ASEAN and to stability in Southeast Asia. But the current situation is uncertain and in some areas the situation is deteriorating. Economic reform is urgent but its feasibility is questionable. There is a crisis of political legitimacy and there is considerable social instability. The humanitarian crisis is extremely severe. After playing an essential role in national development the Armed Forces or Abri is uncertain about its role and future. In a report, Abri in the 21st Century, released earlier this month on the 53rd Anniversary of the Armed Forces, General Wiranto admitted Abri had exceeded its so called two function role under Suharto but he stressed that Abri cannot be cut off from politics. Clearly the Abri can play an important role in maintaining national cohesion and stability. But political realities are such in the United States, Australia and the European Union that our ability to assist Abri in the reform process may be severely circumscribed.

There is a palpable desire in Indonesia, but also throughout the region, for economic and political reform and an end to cronyism and corruption. People want democracy and transparency, which are the best guarantees of security. This is not to say that states should have the Westminster or United States models but clearly people want a role in the government decision making process. The belief that individuals will be content simply if they are fed, have work and a roof over their head has long since been discredited. Burma clings to this primitive delusion and it's decent into the political and economic maelstrom accelerates daily.

Moving next to Oceania, Australia and New Zealand must balance preserving their Western heritage with political and economic engagement with Asia. Their participation the Five Power Defense Arrangement is not an unimportant contribution to regional security. This makes the recent Malaysian decision to cancel the annual exercise for the first time in a quarter of a century that much more regrettable. Both the developed states of Oceania must maintain the domestic political consensus required for continuing vital assistance to the needy states of the South Pacific and encourage others such as the United States, Japan and the European Union to provide development and investment assistance.

For their part the Islanders' top priority must be to persuade the world community that issues such as global warming, environmental protection and the sustainability of high seas maritime resources are not abstruse subjects for periodic international conferences like Rio and Kyoto. Rather, these are issues, which go to the heart of their national security and indeed their survivability. They must be addressed urgently and compassionately.

In concluding, let me note that almost every think tank has held conferences on the impact of the Asian financial crisis. At the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, we have two such meetings, one with United States participants and one with participants from the region. I have read most of the conference reports. A common theme is that the financial crisis has demonstrated -- that the United States remains the essential economic, political and security stabilizer in Asia.

I share this view. As my previous remarks will have indicated, I believe the United States is living up to its leadership obligations. But, as I suggested at the outset, true leadership always recognizes that genuine consultation and cooperation across the spectrum are essential to its effective exercise. That is why the international business community and organizations like PBEC can play a particularly useful and constructive role in helping governments cope with the current crisis.

Thank You.

These views are the personal views of the speaker and do not reflect the views of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies or the United States Government.