UNITED STATES MEMBER COMMITTEE | EVENTS | U.S. EVENTS | 2002 APC | LARRABEE
PACIFIC BASIN ECONOMIC COUNCIL
UNITED STATES MEMBER COMMITTEE | EVENTS | U.S. EVENTS | 2002 APC | LARRABEE
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The PBEC US Annual Policy Conference 2002
Getting Back to Business: Pacific Rim Growth and Security
Remarks by Richard M. Larrabee Without a doubt security issues are a new national priority and that is certainly true in the maritime industry and in the Port Authority of NY & NJ. For those of you not familiar with the Port Authority of NY & NJ or our port: We're a unique bi-state agency responsible for the regional transportation and economic development facilities in the New York metropolitan area, including the three major airports: LaGuardia, JFK International and Newark International airports, the bridges and tunnels between New York and New Jersey, a mass transit system between the two states and the owner of the major marine terminal facilities in the port The Port of New York and New Jersey is the largest seaport on the East Coast of North America. Third largest in the nation by volume behind LA and Long Beach. We handled over 3 million container units last year. We're the largest handler of petroleum products and automobiles in the U.S. The Port Authority was also the owner of the World Trade Center, although last summer we had signed a long term net lease for the property to a private real estate interest. The Trade Center was also our headquarters. We were among many who were directly and personally affected by the attacks of September 11th We lost:
Our ability to literally crawl out from the rubble and get back to work is a testament to our agency and our people, but the loss for us is real and our healing continues. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Coast Guard, correctly, closed the port. They restricted the water side of the harbor, Port Authority, state and local law enforcement shut down the terminals and closed off access to port facilities by land. We had three main priorities following the attacks:
We found most, unfortunately not all of our people. Remarkably, those in the Port Commerce Department were all back to work in new, scattered locations within five days of the attack. The Port Authority actually met its payroll the week of the attack. These demonstrations of commitment, loyalty and perseverance won't be forgotten. We then focused our efforts on reopening the port. I'm proud of the fact that within 2 days after the attacks, we were able to re-open the port and it was no easy task. We had to convince a lot of people that we had sufficient measures in place to be able to re-open the port without adding risk to an already traumatized region. We were successful in doing that because of the remarkable cooperation that we had among the Coast Guard, Customs, our private terminal operators and multiple law enforcement agencies. The new security procedures put in place when the port re-opened included:
With all of these measures in place the port successfully reopened without incident and, to my knowledge, not a single ton of cargo was lost or diverted to another port. Since those first few weeks immediately after the attacks, many of these security measures have been modified, not because the threat has changed (in fact recent FBI terrorism alerts remind us that the risk of threats against our nation remain very high) but because the agencies involved simply do not have the resources to maintain such a high level of staffing and resource deployment. This leads to the broader question of what is required to secure our ports and what resources will be made available? This is a discussion that is taking place throughout our industry and in Washington. Some are calling for inspecting every container that comes into a port in the U.S. On average about 6000 containers a day come into the Port of NY & NJ alone. Inspections of each of these containers on a daily basis not only would require a huge amount of resources, but it also would result in unacceptable levels on congestion on our marine terminals. Perhaps more importantly however, discovering a container that is loaded with a weapon of mass destruction when it arrives in our port on U.S. soil is too late, especially when we consider that most of the major ports in our country, like in New York, are in the middle of major metropolitan areas. As we talk to legislators and other leaders we point out that our international transportation system has been designed to speed the flow of cargo as quickly, efficiently and with the fewest interruptions as possible. This system has been built up over the past few decades in response to this "just-in-time" mentality of our society and our business world. It is not a system that was designed with "security first" as its priority. The challenge we face is how do we improve our security measures, protect the public and instill confidence in the security of the system, without causing major disruption to that system. To date, there are no clear answers even as Congress continues to advance legislation to establish some new requirements. I firmly believe that to be truly effective we need an international solution. I agree with comments made by Coast Guard Commandant Loy that the I.M.O. needs to play a central role here to develop international protocols for handling cargo, assigning responsibility for the contents of a container at the point of origin and greater confidence throughout the chain of custody for a container about the contents in that box and whose responsible for it. I know that there is a meeting of the I.M. O. on this very subject later this month and I look forward to learning the results of that meeting. Reaching a consensus on the issue of port security is absolutely critical. On September 11th the Port of New York and New Jersey was not the target, but the port was closed, rightfully so, for two days until we were able to put into place measures that provided a level of confidence that the port could be safely reopened with new security measures in place. However, if there is an incident that involves a port or an oceangoing vessel is used as a weapon against a U.S. target then the real and psychological impact of such an attack will make it much, much harder to convince those who need to be convinced to resume port activities. The impact of an extended closing of a port like New York and New Jersey would have major implications on the entire international logistics and national transportation network. It also would have major impacts on critical supplies, such as the delivery of petroleum products, to American industry. It is imperative therefore that we develop as quickly as possible port security measures that not only defend against attack, but instill the confidence in our government leaders that sufficient measures are in place to protect our citizens and the transportation system. Thank you for the opportunity to participate today and I look forward to our discussion on this topic. |