Dr. Michel Oksenberg
Senior Fellow, Asia Pacific Research Center
Stanford University
I originally intended to speak on Chinese domestic affairs, Chinese foreign policy, and Sino-American relations. But I have decided to change my topic, in light of the historically significant Taiwan elections.
What are the implications of the crushing defeat of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party, the strong showing of James Song, and above all, the triumph of Chen Shui-pien and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)?
Let there be no mistake. An era has ended. For 77 years, the venerable Kuomintang Party, founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1923, ruled a portion of Chinese territory -- first in south China, then in the lower Yangtze, followed by its World War II years in the southwest, and ultimately, on Taiwan after its 1949 defeat at the hands of its bitter Communist Party rivals. Through most of its history, the KIT sought to bring unity to a land split by domestic turmoil and foreign aggression. It shared with its mortal communist foe an allegiance to China's unity, and even today, in no small measure it reflects its mainland origins. Despite its defeat, however, the KIT remains the majority party in the Taiwan legislature and controls many commercial enterprises on the island.
James Song, who advocates accommodation with mainland and broke away from the KIT, will be a potent political force in Taiwan politics. His strong showing manifests the deep unease that a substantial portion of Taiwan's population have toward outgoing President Lee Teng-hui's hostile posture toward the mainland.
In contrast, the DPP has different origins. It grows out of Taiwan's distinctive twentieth century history under first Japanese and then KIT dictatorship. It is rooted in the yearning of many Taiwanese to rule their island rather than to be dominated by mainland Chinese, Japanese, or Americans. The DPP's leaders and members have few intimate links to the mainland. Its platform explicitly calls for Taiwan independence.
Chen's historic accomplishment therefore understandably generates considerable nervousness in many quarters. Beijing fears the accelerated Taiwan drift from the mainland will culminate in its permanent political severance from the mainland and its international acceptance as a full and separate nation state. China's leaders also blame the United States for enabling the process occur.
Many in Taipei are apprehensive that Chen's supporters will act vindictively toward the mainlanders who suppressed anti-KIT elements during the years of harsh dictatorial rule. Moreover, they fear that Chen will include within his cabinet and inner circle DPP hotheads who rhetoric and actions could provoke a war with China. Such extremists within the DPP call for Taiwan acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or a level of military integration with the United States and Japan that would destroy the foundations of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations.
And many sober analysts in Washington worry that a Sino-American war over Taiwan could result from miscalculations in Beijing over American resolve to assist Taiwan in case of an unprovoked attack or missteps by a new Taipei administration that erroneously concludes it has unlimited American support. The consequences of a Sino-American war are almost too horrible to contemplate. Even limited Chinese military action -- such as seizure of Taiwanese ships in the Strait or of lightly defended islands -- would ignite American assistance to Taiwan. The unpredictable dynamics of escalation would be unleashed, with the inevitable unknowns about the extent, duration, and intensity of the confrontation. While the United States would prevail, the cost to the United States would be enormous, to China even more, so, and the prosperous and democratic Taiwan of today would be destroyed in the process. A protracted or severe conflict would prompt financial flight from the region, end East Asian prosperity, wreck China's progress of the past twenty years, generate Japanese rearmament, and leave a legacy of Sino-American bitterness that would plague the world for generations to come.
Let me be clear. I think such a scenario is unlikely. Chen Shui-pien's election, in my opinion, need not appreciably add to the danger of conflict. Having garnered only forty percent of the total vote in comparison to James Song's thirty seven percent, Chen does not enjoy a broad mandate to alter Taiwan's policy toward Beijing. Further, international financial markets are likely to impose discipline upon his behavior.
Further, a road to war can be avoided if Beijing, Taipei, Tokyo, and Washington realistically recognize the danger and avoid complacency. And to speak frankly, inflammatory rhetoric such as that voiced by the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and the American Majority Leader of the House of Representatives Tom DeLay is precisely what is not needed at this time.
Rather, I prefer to emphasize the positive. I believe that Chen Shui-pien's election offers new opportunities. With vision, calmness, and restraint, Beijing, Taipei, Washington,and Tokyo now have an opportunity to embark upon a more stable and beneficial path.
Rather than viewing Chen's election as a disaster, Beijing would be wise to recognize the opportunity his ascent could offer: an end to the protracted KMT-CCP civil war and the beginning of an expansion of cross strait relations in such areas as telecommunications, shipping, and aviation. Chen has expressed this desire. Further, Beijing could test Chen's intentions by proclaiming a moratorium on its missile deployments across from Taiwan, in hopes that Chen would respond by deferring interest in acquisition of theater missile defense (TMD) systems.
In short, Beijing should not immediately transfer to Chen Shui-pien all its frustrations and impatience that arose from Lee Teng-hui ill chosen words and deeds. Chen's unassailable commitment to Taiwan's autonomy may give him greater political flexibility to expand economic, cultural, and technological relations. That is what he has said he wishes to do. And as that process unfolds, it may be possible to build trust and to reach compromises on the sensitive political issues that currently defy solution.
But the burden does not rest entirely on Beijing. Chen Shui-pien bears a pivotal responsibility to discipline his rhetoric (such as the way he refers to Taiwan's status in world affairs or whether he rejects the notion of "one China). Selection of his cabinet and close advisors will also reveal much about his judiciousness. For example, some high level DPP officials have advocated that Taiwan should seek weapons of mass destruction; they seek a level of Taiwan-American-Japanese military cooperation that would destroy Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. They treat American and Japanese security interests with disdain and in reality endanger Taiwan's security. International financial markets are likely to evaluate carefully the composition of Chen's cabinet and to judge whether it merits confidence.
Chen's seriousness, in short, can be judged not only by his behavior toward the mainland but toward Washington, Tokyo, and other Asia Pacific nations. Will he recognize his obligations toward the United States and others who have assisted the island to reach its advanced stage of development?
Washington and Tokyo have responsibilities as well. Taiwan's successful and orderly transfer of power merits great praise and support. But the embrace of Taiwan's new administration should be conditioned by his performance. Will Chen's rhetoric, policies, and appointments merit the external support that he needs? I believe Chen will meet the test. Nonetheless, rather than enacting the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act which mandates increased Taiwan-American military cooperation or deciding now to provide Taiwan with significant new weapons systems, for example, it would seem prudent for Washington first to judge the temperament and disposition of its new partner. After all, one doesn't board a bus when there is a risk the driver may steer the bus off a cliff.
At the same time, Washington and Tokyo must remove any doubts in Beijing about their commitment to Taiwan. The American military posture in the Western Pacific must remain robust and ready for all contingencies. The United States and Japan should neither pressure Taiwan to enter into political dialogue with Beijing nor so indulge Taipei that it feels no need to do so. The urge for dialogue must come from within. It is up to Taiwan's leaders to conclude that the best way to protect the island's welfare is in cooperation with the mainland rather than in defiance of it.
In this sense, Chen's election has not altered the underlying strategic reality. The responsibility of the United States and Japan remains -- as for the past two decades -- to maintain a security architecture in the western Pacific that preserves stability and enables the mainland and Taiwan to expands their contacts without jeopardizing the security or affronting the dignity of either. How, when, and at what pace they do so is their business -- as long as they do it peacefully.