Originally published in The Straits Times – courtesy of the Lowry Institute
The recent Quad summit was something of a victory lap for President Joe Biden’s Asia strategy.
Yet the success of the Biden administration’s approach to deepening ties with a small group of capable partners has also been its limitation. The three Quad partners together accounted for nearly 40 per cent of US high-level diplomatic activity in the Indo-Pacific, tracked by the Lowy Institute for the 2024 edition of the Asia Power Index, released this week. The US had no engagement at secretary of state or presidential level with 11 of 27 other countries in the region. Contrast this to China, which engaged with all but two countries covered by the latest Lowy survey.
US defence engagement likewise has doubled down on alliances, especially with Japan. Of the nearly 500 combined training activities that the US held with regional partners in 2022 and 2023, more than 330 involved Japan. And around 70 per cent of US defence meetings were held with its five treaty allies: Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.
This matters because unlike in Europe, where most countries are US treaty allies through Nato, in Asia, allies are the exception, not the rule. Non-aligned countries are the numerical majority and the centre of gravity at the heart of regional institutions such as Asean.
Read more here: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/quad-summit-shows-strengths-limits-biden-s-foreign-policy